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The overall growth performance of the MENA region over the period 1960-1998 has been 
both mixed and characterized by a higher degree of volatility compared with other regions in 
the world. In comparing the growth pattern of the MENA region within an international 
perspective, we have found that: capital is less efficient; the natural resource curse more 
pronounced; trade openness less beneficial to growth; the impact of adverse external shocks 
higher; and the effect of output volatility on growth more detrimental. Total Factor 
Productivity Growth (TFPG) in the MENA region, was not an important source of growth in 
comparison with other regions. Non-oil and diversified economies have faired much better 
than oil-exporting countries both in terms of output growth and TFPG. Finally, the degree of 
exposure to internal and external shocks, the extent of economic diversification and 
international competitiveness, were found to be important factors explaining variations in 





* The authors would like to thank Bill Easterly, Dani Rodrik, Jong-Wha Lee, Seppo Honkapohja and others 
for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper presented during the World Bank sponsored Workshop on 
the Global Development Network held in Prague during the period June 9-11, 2000.  3  
1. Introduction 
  Over the last fifteen years or so, growth performance of the MENA region as a whole 
has been disappointing and mixed relative to that of the rest of developing countries.
1  In 
comparison with other regions in the world, growth rates in MENA countries have been 
remarkably volatile and at times lower than that of the poor-performing regions such as Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). 
 
  This growth pattern is believed to be inextricably linked to several characteristics of 
most of the countries in the region notably, their heavy dependence on oil; weak economic 
base; high population growth and unemployment rates; low rates of returns on investment in 
physical and human capital; low level of integration in the world economy; under-
development of market institutions and, with very few exceptions, the omnipresence of the 
State.  
 
  The relative better growth performance of MENA countries in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 
the first half of the 1980’s is largely attributed to favorable external environment in the form 
of high energy export prices. This situation has been reversed in the second half of the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s resulting in sharp declines in domestic investment, savings and growth. 
Although oil is justifiably perceived by many as the most important source of growth in the 
MENA countries, other factors have also played an important role in shaping the growth 
picture of the region.
2  
 
                                                  
1 Unless otherwise mentioned, the definition of MENA followed in this paper includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. On the other hand, MENA oil-exporting 
countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. 
 
2 MENA countries currently sit on more than the third of proven world oil reserves  and  account for more than 30% of 
actual world production.    4  
  There is hardly any disagreement about the necessity for MENA countries to rely on 
less volatile sources of growth that would insulate the region from adverse external 
developments. The external environment is not likely to be as favorable as it had been since 
the early 1970’s and until the mid 1980’s. Analyzing what have been the main determinants 
of the recent growth performance is a first step toward identifying what needs to be done to 
make growth more sustainable.  
 
  The recent empirical growth literature has suggested a wide range of growth 
correlates. The list includes among others, initial conditions, macroeconomic performance, 
trade openness, government size, income distribution, financial market development, natural 
resource abundance, institutions, politics and physical geography. These ultimate sources of 
growth have been shown to be as important as the proximate factors of growth namely, 
physical capital, labor and the efficiency with which these factors are combined. 
 
  This paper will attempt to use the broader framework provided by the recent empirical 
growth literature to measure the relative contribution of the main sources of growth in the 
MENA countries. It will also address the issue of whether MENA growth pattern is unique or 
could be fully explained by means of a global framework.  For this reason, the recent growth 
pattern of the MENA region will be analyzed within both international and regional 
perspectives. By doing so we hope to map out the micro-growth issues that need to be 
addressed by further studies at individual-country level. 
 
  Section 2 gives an overview of the growth performance of the countries of the region 
during the period 1960-1998. Using an empirical model based on large cross-country data 
sets, section 3 provides an account for the main proximate and ultimate sources of growth in 
the MENA region. Section 4 analyzes the growth performance of the MENA countries from a 
regional perspective. Section 5 concludes. 5  
2.  Growth Record of the MENA Region 
 
Over the period 1960-1998, MENA growth has followed the growth pattern of the World 
economy. As shown in table 1, after a period of relatively high growth rates during the 1960’s 
and 1970’s, growth has slowed down during the 1980’s and 1990’s. However, the impact of 
the worldwide recession in the early 1980’s has been more pronounced for MENA countries 
whose growth performance has not only been below world average but also weaker than that 
of the low-performing SSA. Table 1 also shows that during the last three decades, MENA 
non-oil exporting countries have fared better than oil-exporting countries in terms of per 
capita GDP growth.  
 
  Another salient feature of the recent growth performance of MENA countries is its 
high volatility. Figure 1 shows that during the period 1960-1998, the average per capita GDP 
growth rate of MENA countries has been characterized by a high variability in comparison 
with world average. Starting from the second half of 1980’s, variability of growth rates has 
declined somewhat but remained higher than that of the average world growth rate. Figure 2 
shows, on the other hand, that the average growth rate of MENA oil-exporting countries is 
much more volatile than their non-oil counterparts.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the patterns of investment and saving in the MENA 
countries, have also followed the growth pattern described above. Both investment and 
domestic saving in the MENA region have declined sharply during the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
Oil countries have borne the brunt of this adjustment with substantial declines in both 
investment and saving ratios. Non-oil countries have maintained, over the same period, fairly 
stable investment rates above the level of their declining saving ratios. 
 
 6  
  In comparing terms of trade fluctuations across a number of regions for the period 
1980-1995, Gamo et al. (1997, p. 14) have found that oil-exporting countries in the region 
have the highest terms of trade variability. In addition, terms of trade variability of MENA 
non-oil exporting countries were also found to be  higher than that of developing countries as 
a group. This pattern may be attributed to the excessive reliance of MENA countries on 
volatile oil receipts accounting for a large part of their total export receipts.  Even non-oil 
MENA countries have been subject to fluctuation in their own terms of trade, being exporters 
of primary products themselves.  Oil price fluctuation has also indirectly affected them 
through its impact on the flows of workers ‘remittances, investment and financial assistance 
flows from oil-exporting countries. All these factors combined show that the MENA region is 
remarkably vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
3.  MENA Economic Growth in a Global Context  
  In this section we will use a cross-country regression framework to put the MENA 
region economic growth in international perspective. We will try to identify a small set of 
regressors that would account for most of the variation in cross-country per capita GDP 
growth. The absence of guidance from growth theory as to which variables to include, makes 
the choice among the great number of possible correlates of growth a difficult one. However, 




  In addition, we will favor variables that are believed to have shaped MENA region’s 
recent growth performance. We will not focus here on the problems of causation, 
endogeneity or the possible correlation between growth correlates. 
 
 
                                                  
3 There is a lot a spuriousness associated with the Barro-type (Barro, 1991) cross-country regression framework.   
However, it could be used as a suggestive tool to measure the relative contribution of the many sources of growth  
across countries and regions.    7  
3.1. Variables to be Used in the Analysis 
  The first type of variables included in the analysis is that pertaining to initial 
conditions. Recent empirical growth literature provides ample evidence about the existence of 
conditional income convergence across countries. Under the assumption of diminishing 
marginal returns to capital, the lower the initial level of income the greater the opportunity of 
catching up through higher rates of capital accumulation and diffusion of technology. 
 
This convergence is evidenced by the negative relationship between the growth rate of 
per capita GDP and the initial level of GDP per capita after controlling for other relevant 
variables such as measures of government policies, institutions, politics and variables related 
to the character of national population. We will take the 1960 level of real GDP per capita, 
Y60, as a measure of initial income. 
 
  Countries with higher initial stock of human capital and knowledge have also been 
found to be able to forge ahead through higher growth rates. The simple inclusion of a 
measure of human capital in a Barro-type regression equation, however, overlooks the dual 
role played by the latter. Human capital not only affects growth as an additional factor of 
production, together with physical capital and labor, but also the efficiency with which these 
factors are combined. 
 
  Ben Habib and Spiegel (1994), have found evidence that human capital affected Total 
Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) through its impact on the capacity of a country to 
innovate and the capability of using and adapting foreign technology. Arguably, human 
capital also encourages the accumulation of other factors of production. In our analysis, a 
measure of human capital will be used to explain both growth as well as TFPG. As a proxy 
for the level of human capital, we will take the 1960 primary school enrollment ratio, 
PESENR60.  8  
 
  Since higher investment ratios, INVY, are generally found to be associated with 
higher growth rates, we include this variable as a regressor without reference to issues of 
causality and endogeneity. In addition and in order to account for the impact of exogenous 
shocks, we have included for each country in the sample the GDP per capita growth of its 
trading partners weighted by trade shares, GPART.
4 It is conventionally assumed that 
positive external shocks are associated with higher growth and vice versa. 
 
  Macroeconomic performance plays an important role for growth sustainability. Fisher 
(1993) has shown that growth is negatively associated with inflation, large budget deficits 
and distorted foreign exchange markets. Among the three measures, we favor inflation for 
several reasons. First, internationally comparable data on budget deficits are scattered and not 
available for a large number of MENA countries. On the other hand, the widely used black 
market premium rate (BMP) as a measure of distortion in foreign exchange market is neither 
a good proxy for the level of distortions in the economy nor an appropriate measure of the 
adequacy of macroeconomic policies. For instance, the low BMP rates in Egypt or the 
Arabian Gulf countries reflect more the abundance of foreign exchange more than the 
absence of distortions in the economy or the presence of stable macroeconomic environment. 
In addition, the high BMP in many countries of the MENA region tend to reflect the impact 
of wars and socio-political instability characterizing these countries.  
 
  Openness has been used extensively in the literature as a major determinant of growth 
performance. Openness affects growth positively to the extent that it magnifies the benefits of 
international knowledge spillover and technological diffusion as well as enforces cost 
discipline through import competition and the drive to export. Openness measured by the 
ratio of trade to GDP is simply not appropriate for the case of MENA countries. Most MENA 
countries have high trade ratios reflecting partly the nature of their factor endowment. 
                                                  
4  The use of the percentage change in the terms of trade as  a proxy for external shocks has not resulted in  statistically 
significant impact on growth. 9  
 
  Following the work of Sachs and Warner (1995), we adopt the definition of openness, 
SOPEN, reported in Sachs and Warner (1997). Openness purports to the fraction of years 
during the period 1970-1990 in which the country is rated as open according to the following 
criteria: (a) Non-tariff barriers covering less than 40 percent or more of traded goods, (b) 
average tariff rates below 40 percent, (c) a BMP of less than 20 percent, (d) no extreme 
controls in the form of taxes, quotas or state monopolies on exports and (e) the country is not 
considered a socialist country.   A value of SOPEN=1 means the country has remained open 
to trade during the entire period, while a value SOPEN=0 means the country remained 
completely closed.  
 
  Among the recently introduced variables into the empirical literature is natural 
resource abundance.
5 Sachs and Warner (1997), for instance, have found compelling 
evidence that countries with high initial ratio of natural resource exports tend to grow slowly 
in subsequent periods. Earlier findings of development literature about the disappointing 
performance of resource-abundant countries have motivated their study on the link between 
natural resources and economic growth. 
 
  Natural resource abundance negatively affects growth through several channels. 
Natural-resource abundant countries tend to exhibit the Dutch-disease syndrome in terms of 
overvalued exchange rates, and hence the difficulty to develop a profitable export-oriented or 
import-competing manufacturing sector.
6 Resource-rich countries are also associated with 
wasteful consumption and public investment behavior, and provide incentives for rent-
seeking and other unproductive activities. In addition, it is widely observed that natural 
resource availability forestalls reform. Finally, the secular decline of world prices of natural 
resources and their high volatility translate into high uncertainty, which, in turn, impacts 
negatively growth. 
                                                  
5  Natural resources are defined as primary agriculture,  fuels and minerals. 
6  Radelet et al. (1997), p. 8. 10  
 
  The idea of incorporating natural resource abundance as a correlate of economic 
growth is of great appeal given the high endowment of MENA countries in natural resources 
notably, oil. However, despite the fact that they could be a curse for long term growth, natural 
resources may also contribute positively to growth. Oil export revenues have contributed to 
the improvement of welfare and helped finance investment in infrastructure and human 
capital in most MENA countries. In fact, many of the MENA oil-producing countries such as 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are ranked by the 1999 Human 
Development Report, among the top 45 countries in the world in terms of the United Nations’ 
Human Development Index.   
 
  The ultimate impact of natural resources on growth is therefore an empirical question. 
In order to measure this impact, we will use the share of exports of primary products in GNP, 
SXP. This variable is measured for the year 1970 and is borrowed from Sachs and Warner 
(1997). 
 
  A final growth agent that is not very frequently used in the recent empirical growth 
literature is the role of output volatility in explaining output growth. Volatility to the extent 
that it properly reflects uncertainty, should be negatively linked to growth. Uncertainty could 
affect growth through many channels. For instance, under irreversibility and large sunk costs, 
uncertainty delays investment decisions and affects output growth. Ramey and Ramey (1995) 
have found empirical evidence on the negative link between output growth and its volatility. 
Binder and Pesaran (1999) have provided a theoretical rationale for this link based on the 
statistical properties of stochastic versions of conventional growth models. 
  
  In our context, inclusion of a volatility variable is justified on the ground that 
volatility of output growth is a salient feature of the MENA region. The factors responsible 
for this volatility include among others fluctuations in world oil prices, weather conditions, 
workers’ remittances, capital flows, not to mention the high level of socio-political instability 11  
and the involvement of many countries in the region in civil wars and regional conflicts. In 
order to measure volatility, we will use the standard deviation of per capita growth rates, 
STDG, over time for each country in the sample. 
 
3.2. Cross-Country Regression Results  
In order to give an order of magnitude to the contribution of the above agents of 
growth, we regress the average growth rate of real per capita GDP on the variables described 
above. All variables, except when it is otherwise mentioned, are averaged over the period 
1960-1998 or any sub-period within it, in case of unavailable data. The sample data is made 
of the 212 countries included in the World Bank database prepared for the Global Research 
Project (GRP) dealing with the sources of growth in the world. Not all the countries in the 
sample were used in the analysis since some of them did not have complete data on all the 
variables pertaining to our analysis. Most of the variables used in this paper, unless otherwise 
mentioned, come from the GRP database. 
 
  In an attempt to disentangle the regional from the global growth characteristics, we 
have allowed for differentiated growth impacts of the relevant variables depending on 
whether the country under study is from the MENA region. In other words, each country 
from the MENA region is allowed to have different slope coefficients from any non-MENA 
country in the sample. In order to do that, we have included interaction between the variables 
under study and a dummy variable, MENA, taking one if the country is from the MENA 
region and zero otherwise. 
 
  Table 4 reports the regression results of our model. With respect to the recent 
empirical literature, our results confirm the relative importance of the investment ratio 
(INVY), macroeconomic performance (INFL), initial level of income (Y60), human capital 
(PESENR60), natural resource abundance (SXP) and the degree of openness (SOPEN) in 12  
affecting long-term growth performance. The respective coefficients of these variables were 
found to have the expected signs and were statistically significant. 
 
  Some of the variables portraying the impact of external shocks (GPART), and 
volatility (STDG), were found to be insignificant for the whole sample. In contrast, these 
same variables turned out to be very significant for the MENA group.  This points to the 
vulnerability of the MENA countries to external shocks and to the many sources of 
uncertainty responsible for the high output volatility in the region. 
 
  To give further evidence on the vulnerability of the MENA region to external shocks, 
we have tried different measures of terms of trade change. However, all of these measures 
turned out to be statistically insignificant. The ambiguous impact of terms of trade on long-
term growth has been reported in several instances in the literature.
7 There are several 
plausible explanations for that. The terms of trade variable has been obtained, given the 
requirements of our cross-country analysis, by computing its average growth over the entire 
period 1960-1998. Therefore, the impact of terms of trade as an exogenous shock could be 
diluted owing to the operated smoothing. In order to take this shortcoming into account, we 
have used the standard deviation of the terms of trade of each country over the entire period 
as an alternative. The new variable turned out to be insignificant as well.  
 
  The impact of terms of trade on economic growth could be proportional to the 
dependence of any country on a limited number of exported commodities. In other words, a 
diversified economy is less likely to be affected by terms of trade decline given that the 
impact will be limited to a relatively small number of sectors. In contrast, a deterioration in 
the terms of trade will be felt throughout the economy in case of high export concentration or 
excessive dependence on a limited number of export commodities such as oil.  
 
                                                  
7  For instance, Gamo et al. (1997, p.  27)  reported a similar result for the case of several countries in the region.  13  
  Finally, the ambiguous effect of terms of trade on growth could be due to the 
asymmetry of this effect. A persistent improvement in terms of trade might lead to an 
improvement in income and expenditure, while a deterioration does not necessarily lead to a 
proportional reduction in these variables. The recent World Bank report on Global Economic 
Prospects (2000), reports several cases in point from the MENA region.
8 For instance, 
following the 1998 slump in oil prices, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia used foreign 
reserves and accumulated foreign assets to alleviate the pressure on fiscal deficits and trade 
balances. In contrast, other oil exporters such as Algeria and Yemen with more binding 
financial constraints had to adjust through expenditure cuts and exchange rate devaluation.  
 
This asymmetry in policy reaction might have affected growth performance in many 
MENA countries by increasing uncertainty. 
 
  Our results also show that the investment coefficient for the MENA region is 
statistically different from and much lower than, that of the whole sample. This result is, at 
prima facie, at odd with the fact that MENA countries have persistently maintained 
investment ratios above world averages.
9 This is largely attributed to the endemic problem of 
capital inefficiency in the MENA countries. 
 
  Many have presented plausible explanations for the low efficiency of capital in the 
MENA region. Page (1998) suggests that this low efficiency of capital is due to the dominant 
role of the state and the nature of capital inflows in the region destined mainly to finance 
public investments and low-productivity projects in the non-tradable sector such as housing.  
He also points out that protectionism and lack of integration in world economy precluded 
these countries from boosting their efficiency and competitiveness. Others, such as El-
Badawi (1999), argue that the low efficiency of capital may be attributed to the fact that most 
                                                  
8  World Bank (2000, pp. 142-143). 
9  Refer to table 2 in the paper. 14  
of the countries in the region provide an inadequate institutional support for investment and 
private sector development. 
 
  Openness does not seem to play as an important role for the MENA region as for the 
whole sample. The lower impact of openness on  growth in the MENA region may be 
explained by the prolonged application of inward-looking strategies based on import-
substitution, by many countries in the region during the 1960’s and 1970’s. The MENA 
region continues to be among the least integrated regions in the World. This fact is illustrated 
by table 5, which compares the speed of trade integration of the MENA region with that of 
other regions in the World.
10  
 
  Oil and natural resource wealth appears to have a more negative impact on the 
economic growth of the MENA region. All of the arguments, discussed earlier,   explaining 
the negative link between natural resource abundance and growth performance, apply in the 
context of the MENA region.  
 
  The results also show that the evidence of convergence after controlling for relevant 
growth correlates is weaker for MENA countries. This points to the need to look for other 
factors that might explain the lack of growth convergence in the region.  
 
The more negative impact of inflation on growth in the MENA region in comparison 
with the whole sample seems at odd with the fact that MENA is not considered among the 
inflation-prone regions such as Latin America. However, if the inflation variable is picking 
up some of the impact of the different sources of policy uncertainty and government-induced 
distortions in the region, then the above result would make sense.       
 
                                                  
10  The speed of trade integration is defined as the percentage change of the ratio of exports to GDP. 15  
3.3. Growth Accounting in International Perspective  
  To further put growth performance in international perspective, we use the growth 
accounting framework to see whether factor accumulation or factor productivity have 
accounted for most of the growth differential between MENA and the other regions in the 
sample. 
 
  Growth can be the result of the growth of inputs such as capital and labor, or their 
productivity. The debate over the share of inputs as compared with that of their total 
productivity is still very lively. The empirical evidence is mixed.  Many such as Mankiw et 
al. (1992), argue that the share of physical and human capital together with population growth 
account for as much as 80 percent of international variation in per capita income. Young 
(1995) on the other hand, argues that what is often labeled as the “Asian miracle,” is the 
outcome of a temporary rapid factor accumulation. Those holding a different view claim that  




  In order to carry out the accounting exercise, we have used a two-factor, 
homogeneous of degree one, Cobb-Douglas production function in per capita form. Capital 
shares required to measure the relative contribution of factor accumulation and productivity 
were estimated using the following regression equation: 
    
                                                  
11  See for instance, Klenow and Clare (1997). 
it it it i i it it L K Log L Y Log ε α λ + ∆ + = ∆ ) / ( ) / (16  
  The slope coefficient in the above equation represents the capital share in output, Y 
represents real output, K the capital stock and L labor. Y is measured by real GDP and is 
obtained from World Bank database. The capital stock data are taken from Nehru and 
Dhareshwar (1994), and L is approximated by total labor force and taken from the World 
Bank world development indicators. Real GDP and capital stock series are based on 1987 
constant prices. 
 
  The sample we used comprises 92 countries and data cover the period 1960-1997. The 
list of countries included in our sample was determined on the basis of the availability of 
capital stock data in Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994).
12 It should be mentioned that since their 
capital series stop at the year 1990, we have used fixed investment figures from World Bank 
database to complete the capital series from 1991 until 1997. 
 
  In order to account for the possible impact of the noise generated by the high 
variability of yearly data, we have estimated two versions of the above equation. A short-term 
version using original data for the output per worker and capital per worker, and a long-term 
version using three-year moving averages of the same variables. 
 
  Table 6 provides the regional averages of capital shares using the two specifications 
indicated above. Looking at table 6, several remarks are in order. First, our estimates of the 
world average capital share were found to be above the commonly assumed values of 0.3 or 
0.4. This finding is in line with recent results provided, for instance, in Senhadji (1999). Bisat 
et al. (1997) have previously found that the average capital share in many countries of the 
MENA region is well above 0.5 and about 0.7 for some oil-producing countries.  
 
                                                  
12  The MENA countries included in the sample are: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, 
Tunisia and Turkey. 17  
  Secondly, high-performing East Asian countries hold the lowest capital shares in the 
group. And thirdly, Latin American and industrialized countries have the highest capital 
shares.  
 
  These findings have an implication for the computation of TFPG. Given the 
difference in regional capital shares, applying the same share for all the countries to compute 
TFPG could be very misleading.  
 
  Table 7 provides estimates of the relative contribution of capital, labor and TFPG to 
economic growth of the countries included in the sample. Overall, the results show the 
predominance of capital contribution over that of labor and TFPG, in growth performance 
during the period 1960-1997. This remark holds true for the high performing East Asian 
countries such as Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. The only exception was Singapore where 
TFPG contribution exceeded that of capital. TFPG has, in general, contributed positively to 
the economic growth of the East Asian group in the sample. The only exception was the 
Philippines.    
 
  For the eleven MENA countries included in the sample, only Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia and Turkey managed to have positive TFPG. Out of the seven remaining MENA 
countries in the sample that had negative TFPG, five were oil-exporting countries.  
 
  In order to assess the relative contribution of the variables accounting for inter-
regional TFPG performance, we have regressed TFPG on relevant variables based on 
recently established results in the literature.
13 We conducted these regressions using values 
for capital shares ranging from 0.3 to 0.7. Each hypothetical value for capital share was 
                                                  
13  Only 6 MENA countries were included in the analysis given the lack of data. They were: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.  
 18  
applied uniformly over the different countries in the sample. This was done to see whether 
different values of the capital share affect the impact of the regressors on TFPG.  
 
  The included regressors were the quality of institutions, ICRG
14; inflation rate, INFL; 
the initial income, Y60; the initial enrollment rate in primary school, PESENR60, and the 
adopted measure of natural resource abundance, SXP.  Other conventional variables such as 
openness, growth in terms of trade and political stability have been tried but were dropped for 
lack of statistical significance. Regional dummies were also included in order to account for 
inter-regional differences. 
 
  Table 8 reveals that for lower values of the capital share, the parameter estimates tend 
to be significant and of the expected signs. Institutions and the stock of human capital, as 
approximated by the initial enrollment rate, affect positively TFPG. The negative sign 
attached to the initial income, points to the existence of catching up effect at the TFPG level. 
Inflation was also found to affect negatively TFPG. Finally, the natural resource curse was 
found to apply at the productivity level too. In other words, natural resource abundance 
affects negatively TFPG. 
 
  At higher values of the capital share, the explanatory power of the model drops. This 
is due to the fact that at higher values of the capital shares, capital accounts for a higher 
portion of overall economic growth as well as TFPG. Hence, the other variables become less 
relevant. However, it should be mentioned that the only two variables that remained 
significant for different values of the capital share, were initial income and human capital. 
This result is widely in line with the recent empirical findings on TFPG.
15 While initial level 
of income affects the potential of catching up notably through higher productivity; human 
                                                  
14  Our measure of institutions, ICRG, is a composite of four indicators (a) Government repudiation of contracts, (b) Risk of 
Expropriation, (c) Rule of Law and (d) Bureaucratic quality. This measure is computed for the decade of the 1980’s and is 
borrowed from Easterly and Levine (1996). Knack and Keefer (1995) were the first to introduce these  institutional variables 
into growth empirics. 
 
15  See for instance the findings of Senhadji (1999) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). 19  
capital affects TFP by determining the capacity of a country to innovate and the speed of 
technological diffusion. 
 
   In order to put MENA countries’ TFPG performance into global perspective, we have 
computed the contribution to TFPG of the relevant variables for different values of the capital 
share. Table 9 reports the results after applying different regional values for the capital share. 
Based on our estimation, we have applied the value of 0.5 to the MENA, Sub-Saharan 
regions as well as to the whole sample. The values applied for other regions were 
respectively, 0.4 for East Asia and 0.7 for Latin America. 
 
  Overall, the results exhibited in tables 9, point to the overriding importance of the 
quality of institutions and the stock of human capital in explaining the lower productivity 
performance of the MENA countries in comparison with the high performing East Asian 
countries and with the rest of the world in general. 
 
  More specifically, table 9 shows that human capital, as approximated by initial 
enrollment ratios, accounts for the MENA region’s TFPG under-performance with respect to 
East Asia and Latin America. Despite the net improvement in many educational educators in 
the MENA countries, illiteracy ratios remain very high and the educational attainment of the 
labor force very low in comparison with other regions in the world. 
 
 For the year 2000, UNESCO predicts that the illiteracy ratio in the MENA region 
will be around 31 percent for adults above 15 years compared to 26 percent in the group of 
developing countries and 13 percent in the East Asia and Pacific region. These statistics are 
even more alarming given the high gender gap in terms of literacy and in comparison with 
other regions in the world. The average illiteracy rate among females in the MENA region for 
the year 2000 is expected to be around 40 percent almost double the average illiteracy rate for 20  
males.
16  Illiteracy among women is linked to poor health and low education attainment 
among children, and hence the low quality of human capital. 
 
The recent statistics published by Barro and Lee (2000) provide further evidence of 
the relative weaker educational attainment of the labor force in the MENA region in 
comparison with other regions in the world. For instance, they estimated that the average 
years of schooling for the population aged 15 and over, for the year 2000, for the high 
performing MENA countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey will be, 5.51, 
6.91, 5.77, 5.02, and 5.29; respectively. These rates do not compare favorably with, 8.83 for 
Argentina, 7.55 for Chile, 10.84 in Korea, 7.05 for Singapore and 8.76 in Taiwan.
17  
 
  Using panel data for six countries in the MENA region, El-Erian et al. (1998, p. 11) 
have found that the rapid expansion in education did not result in higher productivity or more 
rapid economic growth.
18 Aside from measurement problems that might have affected their 
results, they argue that the weak link they have found between education and growth may be 
attributed to the low quality in the delivery of educational services and labor may be markets 
distorted educational choices in these countries. 
 
They argue that education systems in the region focus more on repetition of 
definitions, knowledge of facts and concepts and less on developing critical thinking and 
problem-solving capacity. On the other hand, the higher wages prevailing in the public sector 
are set without consideration for alternative employment opportunities in other sectors. This 
has led to an education system that is focused on preparing students for public employment.  
ERF (2000) reports that for the early 1990’s, the average share of civilian Government 
employment in the MENA region is about 17.5 percent compared with less than 9 percent for 
                                                  
16  These statistics are derived from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1999). 
 
17  These updated statistics  are available on the following web  site: http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/. The data set 
could also be accessed through the web page of Jong-Wha Lee: http://web.korea.ac.kr/~jwlee.      
18 The countries included in their studies are: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria and Tunisia. 21  
the developing countries as a group. In addition, the share of central Government wages in 
GDP is at 10 percent; almost double that of the world average. As rightly argued by the 
report, these statistics reflect the prevalence of acute job redundancies in the region.
19  
 
A close line of argument is presented by Ridha (1998) who argues that, the quality of 
education in most countries of the region is low because education systems are over-
politicized to the extent that they deviate from the objectives they are supposed to achieve. 
He asserts that, the educational systems in the region are manipulated to reach political ends.  
His argument is best summarized by the following excerpts: 
 
“Indoctrination replaced free and critical thinking, and authoritarian values permeated 
every educational tool and practice: the curriculum, the textbooks, and the methodology 
of teaching.”       (Ridha 1998, pp. 3-4). 
 
 Another argument advanced by Pritchett (1996) can possibly explain the weak link 
between education and productivity growth in the MENA countries. He argues that in a 
perverse institutional environment such as the one prevailing in many MENA countries, 
education and accumulated capital could be used in wasteful and counterproductive activities. 
In addition, the fact that most of these countries are natural resource-abundant, provides 
further incentives for the proliferation of  rent seeking activities. 
 
  The second important factor explaining the underperformance of the MENA region in 
terms of TFPG is the quality of institutions. Institutions can be defined as the regular and 
patterned forms of social behavior and interaction among human beings established by formal 
and informal rules. Institutions matter for growth and productivity because they affect 
incentives of actors. For they affect the behavior of people in a society and very often lock 
their behavior within a regularized pattern, institutions may produce path dependence that 
                                                  
19  ERF (2000), p.6. 22  
could explain prolonged periods of poor economic performance and hence the inability of 
poor countries to catch up. 
 
  Table 10 shows that MENA countries have made some efforts to improve their 
institutions. Using the average scores for five institutional indicators published by the 
Political Risk Services, the figures show a net improvement in all indicators between 1984 
and 1995. MENA countries have even better scores than world averages for three out of the 
five reported indicators. The indicators of corruption and bureaucracy remain, however, 
below world averages. In addition, the average value of the variable used in our paper to 
depict institutional quality, ICRG, for MENA countries was 4.31. This score is below that of 
the world average, 5.59, and the high performing East Asian countries, 6.37. 
 
Reducing bureaucratic ineffectiveness, red tape, corruption, excessive government 
intrusion, and improving the deplorable state of government service delivery; remain, in this 
regard, major challenging tasks for the MENA region. 
 
4. Explaining Intra-Regional MENA Growth Performance    
  In the previous section, MENA countries’ growth performance has been compared 
with other reference regions. In this section, we will dwell on the relative performance of 
individual MENA countries with respect to the region’s average performance. 
 
  There is a considerable variation in the growth performance of MENA countries. It 
was shown earlier that growth in oil-exporting countries was subject to a higher variability 
than that of non-oil exporting countries. In addition, the average growth performance of the 
oil exporting countries over the period 1960-1998, has been below that of non-oil exporting 
countries. Table 11 shows that the countries that were able to achieve an average real per 
capita GDP growth rate over 2 percent a year, during the period 1960-1998 were, except for 
Oman, non-oil exporting countries. The best growth performers were Egypt, Jordan, 23  
Morocco, Oman, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Oman’s average growth rate was the highest 
followed by that of Egypt and Tunisia.  
 
  In order to assess the relative performance of each MENA country with respect to the 
average performance of the MENA group, we have first computed for each country a yearly 
z-score defined as the distance of its growth rate of GDP per capita with respect to the 
average per capita growth rate of the whole sample of MENA countries, divided by the 
standard deviation of this growth rate over the same year.  The better achievers have then 
been defined as those countries whose average z-scores over the entire sample period were 
positive. 
 
    After excluding countries for which ample data were not available, the over-
achievers were: Oman (0.43), Egypt (0.30), Tunisia (0.27), Turkey (0.25), Jordan (0.23), 
Syria (0.12) and Morocco (0.09). All MENA oil-exporting countries, except Oman had 
negative average z-scores. 
 
  Interestingly enough, only countries with relatively high growth rates have managed 
to achieve positive TFPG over the last three decades or so. Oil-exporting countries have, in 
general, had negative TFPG. These facts are corroborated by our own estimates and those of 
the few studies, which have provided estimates for TFP growth rates for countries in the 
MENA region such as, Bisat et al. (1997) and Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994).  
 
In addition, MENA growth over-achievers had in general the lowest growth 
variability among the sample group except, Oman. The higher variability of the latter can be 
attributed to the fact that it is an oil-exporter and therefore subject to the effect of oil price 
fluctuation.  
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  Available data and the scope of this study do not permit to establish systematic links 
between growth performance and the country-specific characteristics (structural, policy, 
initial conditions, institutional, political, and other internal and external factors). Preliminary 
analysis indicates, however, that the better achievers tend to have above average indicators 
for integration in the world economy (be it through the crude measure of openness, share of 
FDI in GDP, or share of manufactured exports in total commodity exports). They also tend to 
be more diversified and have enunciated economic reform earlier than other countries. 
 
  Table 12 exhibits the sectoral distribution of production of selected MENA countries 
according to their estimated z-scores.  The numbers show that countries, which better growth 
performance, tend to be more diversified than the other countries, with relatively larger 
manufacturing and service sectors. In contrast,   countries with weaker growth performance 
have either large agriculture or mining and quarrying sectors. The latter countries tend, 
therefore, to be more exposed to variation in climatic and international market conditions 
than other countries.   
 
Using the normalized Hirshman export concentration index, we found also that 
MENA growth over-achievers have the lowest values of this index compared to other 
countries. For 1995, these indexes were: 0.112 for Turkey, 0.172 for Morocco; 0.211 for 
Tunisia; 0.244 for Egypt; 0.270 for Jordan and 0.533 for Syria.
20 These rates compare 
favorably with 0.940 for Kuwait; 0.798 for Iran, 0.796 for Iraq and 0.765 for Oman.  
 
  In order to account for the relative growth performance within the MENA region, we 
have used a cross-country regression framework applied to a panel data of 13 MENA 
countries and spanning the period 1970-1998. For the sake of increasing sample variation, we 
have used for each country six five-year period averages for all  variables and for the periods 
1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-1998. 
                                                  
20  These rates are taken from UNCTAD (1999). They were computed based on the 3-digit SITC classification, revision 2.  
A value of the index closer to zero means more export diversification and vice  versa. 25  
 
  We have adopted the same cross-country regression framework used previously. 
However, some of the variables were discarded for lack of statistical significance. Other 
variables were appended in order to reflect either specific characteristics of the region or 
cross-country differences in terms of factors affecting growth. For instance, we have included 
government consumption as a ratio to GDP, GCY, to reflect the predominant role of the state 
in the region and the impact of government-induced distortions. We have also included the 
share of manufactures in total merchandise exports, MANUF, to reflect the impact of 
economic diversification (or the lack of it) on growth as well as the extent of competitiveness 
in international markets. The debt-service ratio, DEBTS, was included to reflect the impact of 
debt overhang on the growth of many countries in the region.  
 
The other variables we have used are: the share of investment in GDP, INVY; the 
GDP per capita growth of each country’s trading partners weighted by trade shares, GPART; 
and the level of income per capita in the beginning of each period, YINI. 
 
  The model was estimated using the random-effect panel regression method.
21  The 
estimation results reported in table 13, show that the parameters of all the variables 
considered were statistically significant and of the expected sign. 
 
  Since data were not available for all the countries and for all the years, only a limited 
number of countries in the sample were used for comparative purposes. Table 14 shows that 
high investment ratios have contributed significantly to the relative better growth 
performance of countries like Oman and Tunisia.  On the other hand, export diversification 
and international competitiveness explain the relative better performance of countries such as 
Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan and Morocco. Debt overhang has negatively impacted growth in 
Algeria, Morocco and Turkey. Large government size has had a detrimental effect on growth 
                                                  
21 Hausman’s specification statistic for the test of fixed versus random effect model was (1.23 at 6 degrees of freedom) in 
favor of the latter. 26  
in Jordan, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Variation in trading partner growth has had a notable 
impact on the growth of oil-exporting countries such as Oman, Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. 
Finally, the high variation in individual country’s intercepts in table 14, points to the fact that 
the country-specific growth determinants or the unexplained growth, remain relatively high. 
These individual factors should be tackled at a more disaggregated country-specific level.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
(1) The overall growth performance of the MENA countries has been both mixed and 
characterized by a higher degree of volatility in comparison with other regions of the 
world. Several sources of uncertainty in the region can explain this volatility. These 
include, among others, fluctuations in world oil prices, weather conditions, workers' 
remittances, capital flows, not to mention factors contributing to socio-political 
instability in the region such as civil wars and regional conflicts. 
 
(2)  In analyzing the growth pattern of the MENA region within an international       
perspective, we have found that: capital is less efficient; the natural resource curse 
more pronounced; trade openness less beneficial to growth; impact of adverse 
external shocks higher; and the effect of output volatility on growth more detrimental.  
 
(3) In comparison with other regions, TFPG was not an important source of growth in the 
MENA region. Among the MENA countries included in the sample, only Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey had positive TFPG.  The quality of institutions and 
human capital accounted for the lower performance of the MENA countries in terms 
of TFPG and in comparison with the other regions of the world. 
 
(4)    The degree of exposure to internal and external shocks, extent of economic 
diversification and international competitiveness were relevant factors in explaining 
variations in growth performance within the MENA region. 27  
  In view of the aggregate nature of our study and in light of the above findings, several 
relevant policy issues deserve further analysis within a country specific context: 
  To achieve sustainable growth in the future, MENA countries must take policy 
measures that should substantially enlarge and diversify their economic base. 
This should go in tandem with measures needed to enhance their capacity to 
withstand adverse domestic and external shocks and lessen their exposure to 
the volatility that the region as a whole has experienced.  Political factors 
apart, far reaching economic and institutional reforms have to be put in place. 
 
  The dominance of the State has given rise to distorted labor market signals 
that have encouraged employment in the public and other low productivity 
sectors. MENA educational systems should be reformed so as to be able to 
dispense the type of education and knowledge that is more in line with the 
requirements of modern market economies rather than one that prepares 
graduates for employment in the public sector. Furthermore, closing the wide 
educational gender gap and reducing illiteracy among women in MENA 
countries should also be a high priority on the agenda of policy makers in 
order to improve the quality of human capital in the future. 
 
  Policies of greater openness and integration in the world economy should be 
vigorously pursued simultaneously with appropriate domestic economic and 
institutional reforms. These policies, as attested by the experiences of the 
MENA and other regions, would contribute positively to growth performance. 
 
  Experience has shown that countries endowed with abundant natural resources 
may tend to delay reform, be less productive and fail to develop a competitive 
manufacturing sector and a more diversified economy. The outcome would 
ineluctably be poorer long-term growth prospects, unless appropriate reforms 
are implemented. 28  
 
  Future research needs to shed important additional lights on the determinants of 
growth in each of the countries concerned. Among the areas that deserve further investigation 
are the within regional variation in the role of human and physical capital, the influence of 
the State and institutions and the relative impact of external and internal shocks as they relate 
to economic growth. It is equally useful to analyze the way ultimate and proximate 
determinants of growth interact in each country. It would be an addition to our understanding 
of the growth process in MENA countries, to show, for instance, how economic policy, 
institutions, politics and other country characteristics affect the way factors of productions are 
used and combined. 
 
  Finally, it would be desirable to analyze the impact of the sectoral decomposition of 
growth in MENA countries. Such a decomposition is useful for identifying the sectors that 
have been successful in achieving better growth performance, expanding investment and 
employment and raising productivity and earnings. This decomposition should also help 
explain why certain sectors have been more successful than others. 29  
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 Real GDP Per Capita Growth 
 
 
Group  1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-1998 
MENA 3.9  3.0  -1.3  1.4 
MENA Oil  5.8  -0.2  -1.6  1.5 
MENA Non Oil  2.9  4.2  -0.5  1.5 
East Asia & Pacific  4.3  3.6  2.6  2.0 
Latin America & Caribbean  2.7  2.3  0.5  2.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.8  1.6  0.2  0.3 
World 3.1  2.5  1.0  0.6 

































































































Group  1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-1998 
MENA 17.4  26.3  24.1  23.3 
MENA Oil  21.3  29.1  23.6  22.1 
MENA Non Oil  14.9  24.1  24.4  23.9 
East Asia & Pacific  19.1  28.6  31.8  35.5 
Latin America & Caribbean  20.4  23.6  20.3  20.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  16.9  21.1  17.5  16.8 
World 24.3  25.3  23.2  22.2 


























Group  1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-1998 
MENA 27.5  28.7  16.0  11.2 
MENA Oil  47.0  52.6  35.0  27.8 
MENA Non Oil  15.3  8.6  7.0  3.7 
East Asia & Pacific  16.3  27.1  31.8  36.3 
Latin America & Caribbean  20.0  21.9  22.8  19.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  17.2  20.4  17.4  15.7 
World 24.2  25.1  23.2  22.6 
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Table 4 
 Cross- Country Growth Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth 
 
 



























































R2-Adj = 0.67 
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Trade in Goods and Services: 
East Asia & Pacific 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan Africa 













































Trade in Manufactures 
East Asia & Pacific 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan Africa 

























































 Regional Average Capital Shares 
 
 
Region  Number of Countries  Average Capital Shares 
(Short-term version) 
Average Capital Share 
(Long-term version) 
Whole Sample (world)  92  0.67  0.59 
MENA 11  0.61  0.54 
East Asia  6  0.48  0.38 
Sub-Saharan Africa  21  0.59  0.48 
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Table 7 
GDP Growth Rate Decomposition (1960-1997) 
 
Country  Growth  Capital  Labor  TFPG  Country  Growth  Capital  Labor  TFPG  Country  Growth  Capital  Labor  TFPG 
Algeria  0.031 0.034 0.006  -0.009  Honduras  0.040 0.034  0.010  -0.004  Norway  0.038 0.018 0.006 0.013 
Angola  0.012 0.028 0.002  -0.017  Iceland  0.040 0.041  0.001  -0.002  Pakistan  0.055 0.019 0.021 0.015 
Argentina  0.026 0.014 0.008  0.003  India  0.044 0.057  -0.002  -0.011  Panama  0.048 0.038 0.012 -0.002 
Australia  0.036 0.046 -0.002  -0.008  Indonesia  0.058 0.033  0.015  0.010  Paraguay  0.047 0.042 0.012 -0.006 
Austria  0.032 0.034 0.001  -0.003  Iran  0.046 0.049  0.010  -0.013  Peru  0.032 0.052  -0.012  -0.008 
Bangladesh  0.035 0.039 -0.006  0.003  Iraq  0.023 0.020  0.020  -0.018  Philippines  0.039 0.041 0.008 -0.010 
Belgium  0.029 0.042 -0.001  -0.011  Ireland  0.046 0.006  0.007  0.032  Portugal  0.042 0.058  -0.001  -0.015 
Bolivia  0.031 0.013 0.011  0.006  Israel  0.058 0.051  0.003  0.004  Rwanda  0.020 -0.043 0.049 0.014 
Brazil  0.048 0.055 0.001  -0.007  Italy  0.033 0.037  0.001  -0.004  Senegal  0.026 0.006 0.019 0.001 
Cameroon  0.031 0.048 0.004  -0.021  Jamaica  0.016 0.023  0.004  -0.012  Sierra Leone  0.010 0.038  -0.006  -0.022 
Canada  0.037 0.029 0.008  0.001  Japan  0.053 0.063  0.003  -0.013  Singapore  0.080 0.026 0.025 0.029 
Chile  0.041 0.033 0.002  0.006  Jordan  0.052 0.116  -0.013  -0.051  South Africa  0.030 0.027 0.009 -0.006 
China  0.068 0.063 0.002  0.003  Kenya  0.048 0.029  -0.002  0.021  Spain  0.039 0.050 0.001 -0.011 
Colombia  0.045 0.041 0.002  0.001  Korea  0.081 0.065  0.012  0.004  Sri Lanka  0.045 0.011 0.017 0.016 
Costa Rica  0.044 0.057 0.002  -0.015  Kuwait  0.022 -0.015  0.056  -0.018  Sudan  0.030 0.028 0.014 -0.012 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.049 0.034 0.014  0.002  Libya  0.058 0.165  -0.011  -0.096  Sweden  0.024 0.025 0.003 -0.003 
Cyprus  0.056 -0.036 0.020  0.072  Luxembourg  0.036 0.033  0.000  0.004  Switzerland  0.022 0.039 0.001 -0.018 
Denmark  0.028 0.020 0.005  0.003  Madagascar  0.013 0.028  -0.004  -0.011  Tanzania  0.038 0.016 0.017 0.005 
Dominican Republic  0.048 0.053 0.007  -0.012  Malawi  0.042 0.017  0.018  0.007  Thailand  0.072 0.055 0.012 0.005 
Ecuador  0.048 0.029 0.011  0.008  Malaysia  0.069 0.046  0.016  0.007  Trinidad and Tobago  0.021 0.019 0.011 -0.009 
Egypt  0.057 0.035 0.011  0.011  Mali  0.033 0.013  0.013  0.006  Tunisia  0.051 0.028 0.012 0.010 
El Salvador  0.034 0.037 0.007  -0.011  Malta  0.059 -0.026  0.015  0.070  Turkey  0.050 0.040 0.007 0.003 
Ethiopia  0.031 0.043 0.007  -0.018  Mauritius  0.047 0.040  -0.009  0.016  Uganda  0.016 0.013 0.015 -0.012 
Finland  0.032 0.022 0.003  0.007  Mexico  0.046 0.063  -0.001  -0.016  United Kingdom  0.023 0.014 0.003 0.006 
France  0.032 0.033 0.002  -0.003  Morocco  0.049 0.025  0.013  0.011  United States  0.031 0.047 -0.009  -0.007 
Germany  0.030 0.025 0.002  0.004  Mozambique  0.020 0.046  -0.008  -0.019  Uruguay  0.019 0.007 0.004 0.008 
Ghana  0.023 0.010 0.018  -0.006  Myanmar  0.034 0.036  0.002  -0.004  Venezuela  0.028 0.012 0.023 -0.006 
Greece  0.040 0.047 0.001  -0.008  Netherlands  0.031 0.027  0.005  -0.001  Zaire  0.005 -0.001 0.027 -0.021 
Guatemala  0.039 0.031 0.007  0.001  New Zealand  0.025 0.035  -0.001  -0.008  Zambia  0.019 0.003 0.018 -0.002 
Guyana  0.015 0.028 -0.011  -0.002  Nicaragua  0.023 0.052  -0.006  -0.022  Zimbabwe  0.039 0.020 0.011 0.008 
Haiti  0.008 0.029 0.004  -0.025  Nigeria  0.030 0.008  0.023  -0.001        43  
Table 8 
Determinants of TFPG at Different Values of Capital Share 
(1),(2),(3)  
Dependent Variable: TFPG 
 
Variable 
         
ICRG  0.24 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.02 
  (3.00)**  (2.31)**    (1.56) (0.83) (0.20) 
INFL  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.0005  -0.0004 
  (-2.08)**  (-1.75)* (-1.44) (-1.17) (-0.94) 
Y60  0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 
  (-6.62)** (-5.37)** (-4.05)**  (-2.8)**  (-1.70) 
PRIM60  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  (2.75)** (2.59)** (2.41)** (2.21)** (2.01)** 
SXP  -1.71 -1.12 -0.55 0.03  0.61 
  (-2.01)** (-1.31)  (-0.61)  (0.04)  (0.62) 
EASIA  -0.19 -0.49 -0.79 -1.09 -1.39 
  (-0.51)  (-1.42)  (-2.38)** (-3.30)** (-4.07)**   
SSA  -0.89 -0.68 -0.47 -0.26 -0.05 
  (-2.60)**  (-1.87)* (-1.20) (-0.61) (-0.11) 
LATIN  -0.67 -0.61 -0.56 -0.50 -0.45 
  (-2.27) (-1.99)** (-1.71)  (-1.43)  (-1.19) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.58 0.45 0.29 0.16 0.09 
Number of Observations  75 75 75 75 75 
(1)  Constant terms not included and t - ratios in parentheses. 
(2)  Estimation based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
      (3)   **: significant at the 5% level, *: significant at the10% level.    







































Mena alpha = 0.5 
SSA alpha = 0.5 
Hasia alpha = 0.4 
Latin alpha =0.7 




























Government Repudiation of Contracts  4.03  5.40  7.78  7.24 
Risk of Expropriation  3.05  5.45  8.78  8.55 
Corruption in Government   2.28  3.42  3.28  3.56 
Rule of Law  1.21  3.30  4.50  4.22 
Quality of Bureaucracy  1.43  3.31  3.22  3.52 
























Country  Period  Average Growth  Standard Deviation of Growth 
Algeria 1961-1998  1.14  8.79 
Egypt 1961-1998  3.15  3.08 
Jordan 1976-1998  2.07  7.97 
Kuwait 1969-1998  -2.90  11.35 
Mauritania 1961-1998  1.52  6.30 
Morocco 1967-1998  2.25  4.61 
Oman 1961-1998  7.38  17.52 
Saudi Arabia  1961-1998  1.72  6.47 
Sudan 1961-1998  0.87  6.21 
Syria 1961-1998  2.88  8.52 
Turkey 1969-1998  2.37  3.58 
Tunisia 1962-1998  3.11  3.82 
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Table 12 
Percentage Sectoral Distribution of Production in Selected MENA Countries: 
Averages for the Period 1960-1998 
 
 
Country  Agriculture  Mining and Quarrying*  Manufacturing  Other Sectors 
With Positive Z-Score 
Egypt 22.9  11.5  19.1  46.5 
Jordan 8.6  12.3  12.4  66.7 
Morocco 18.2  14.1  17.2  50.5 
Oman 17.4  55  1.5  26.1 
Syria 22.5  9.9  13.5  54.1 
Tunisia 15.6  13.9  13.0  57.5 
Turkey 25.3  9.0  16.6  49.1 
Average 18.6  18.0  13.3  50.1 
With Negative Z-Score 
Algeria 11.3  34.9  11.4  42.4 
Iran 19.7  25.2  10.7  44.4 
Kuwait 0.4  54.5  6.9  38.2 
Mauritania 31.4  18.4  11.6  38.6 
Saudi Arabia  4.6  55.0  7.3  33.1 
Sudan 40.9  7.5  7.2  44.4 
U.A.E. 1.4  59.5  6.6  32.5 
Average 15.7  36.4  8.8  39.1 
*Includes Construction, Electricity and Gas. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000. 
 





 Panel Data Estimation of Growth Determinants in the MENA RegionDependent Variable: 




Variable  Coefficient  T-Ratio 
INVY 0.15 2.46** 
DEBTS -0.10 -2.91** 
GPART 0.91  2.48** 
MANUF 0.03  1.72* 
YINI -0.0004  -4.48** 
GCY -0.16  -2.33** 
Number of Countries = 15; Number of observations used = 61;R
2-adj = 0.51; Country intercepts not reported. 


















Relative Contribution of Relevant Variables to Growth Differential in Selected MENA Countries 
 
 
Country  Predicted 
Growth  INVY  DEBTS  GPART  MANUF  YINI  GCY  Individual 
effect 
Algeria  0.36 4.88  -4.38 1,65 0.07  -0.98  -2.44  1.  54 
Bahrain  -1.21 3.94 0.00  0.36  0.27  -3.74  -3.41  1.36 
Egypt  2.93 3.27  -1.76 1.90 0.91  -0.60  -2.60  1.81 
Iran  -0.03 3.72 -0.27 1.50  0.08  -1.69  -3.13  -0.23 
Jordan  2.19 4.52  -1.56 1.52 1.40  -1.10  -4.23  1.64 
Morocco  1.66 3.56  -3.02 1.45 1.34  -0.71  -2.72  1.76 
Oman  3.15 4.16  -0.35 2.64 0.55  -2.46  -4.23  2.85 
Saudi Arabia  0.02 3.18 0.00 2.37 1.15  -3.37  -4.09  1.77 
Sudan  0.45 1.96  -1.75 1.35 0.04  -0.30  -1.93  1.09 
Syria  1.67 3.47  -1.36 1.52 0.67  -1.58  -2.60  1.54 
Tunisia  3.09 4.11  -1.91 1.55 1.85  -0.98  -2.45  0.92 
Turkey  2.33 2.95  -2.58 1.39 1.58  -1.13  -1.65  1.78 
U.A.E.  -3.09 4.23 0.00  2.28  0.99  -9.25  -2.55  1.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 